Workplace Unionism, Collective Bargaining and Skill Formation: New Results from Mixed Methods

55 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2019 Last revised: 16 Apr 2023

See all articles by Fabio Berton

Fabio Berton

University of Turin

Anna Carreri

University of Verona

Francesco Devicienti

University of Turin

Andrea Ricci

ISFOL, Rome (Italy)

Abstract

Among the steps to improve a country's competitiveness, several commentators and international institutions include a general emphasis on deregulation and decentralization of industrial relations. In this paper, we contribute to this debate by studying whether and how firm-level unionism and collective agreements affect workplace training, a key ingredient to competitiveness. Theory provides inconclusive predictions on the various channels and processes through which firm-level industrial relations may affect workplace training.Quantitative and qualitative analyses, when used in isolation, have also proved insufficient for an adequate account of the various factors at play. This is where our paper mostly contributes. In the spirit of opening the "black box" of firm-level unionism and collective bargaining, we mix together quantitative and qualitative strategies. Our results suggest that workplace unionism, and especially decentralized collective agreements, favor workplace training in subtler and often more dynamic ways than commonly understood.

Keywords: industrial relations, workplace training, firm-level bargaining, Italy

JEL Classification: J24, J52

Suggested Citation

Berton, Fabio and Carreri, Anna and Devicienti, Francesco and Ricci, Andrea, Workplace Unionism, Collective Bargaining and Skill Formation: New Results from Mixed Methods. IZA Discussion Paper No. 12712, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3483950 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3483950

Fabio Berton (Contact Author)

University of Turin ( email )

218 bis
Corso Unione Sovietica
Torino, 10134
Italy

Anna Carreri

University of Verona

Via dell'Artigliere, 8
Verona, 37129
Italy

Francesco Devicienti

University of Turin

Via Po 53
Torino, 10100
Italy

Andrea Ricci

ISFOL, Rome (Italy) ( email )

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