Trade Policy and Market Power: Firm-Level Evidence

34 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2019

See all articles by Alan Asprilla

Alan Asprilla

University of Lausanne

Nicolas Berman

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID)

Olivier Cadot

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Melise Jaud

World Bank

Date Written: October 29, 2019

Abstract

This paper identifies the effect of trade policy on market power through new data and a new identification strategy. It uses a large data set containing export values and quantities by product and destination for all exporting firms in 12 developing and emerging countries over several years, merged with destination-product-specific information on tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Market power is identified by observing how exporting firms price discriminate across markets in reaction to variations in bilateral exchange rates. Pricing-to-market is prevalent in all regions of the sample, even among small firms, although it is increasing in firm size, in accordance with theory. More importantly, the effect of non-tariff measures is not isomorphic to that of tariffs: the observed pricing-to-market behavior suggests that, although tariffs reduce the market power of foreign firms through classic rent-shifting effects, non-tariff measures alter market structure and reinforce the market power of non-exiting firms, domestic and foreign ones alike.

Suggested Citation

Asprilla, Alan and Berman, Nicolas and Cadot, Olivier and Jaud, Melise, Trade Policy and Market Power: Firm-Level Evidence (October 29, 2019). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 9050, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3485934

Alan Asprilla (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, Vaud CH-1015
Switzerland

Nicolas Berman

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) ( email )

PO Box 136
Geneva, CH-1211
Switzerland

Olivier Cadot

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland
+41 21 692 3463 (Phone)
+41 21 692 3495 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Melise Jaud

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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