Privatization of the Police

32 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2019 Last revised: 13 Oct 2020

See all articles by Hans-Bernd Schäfer

Hans-Bernd Schäfer

Bucerius Law School; University of Hamburg

Michael Fehling

Bucerius Law School

Date Written: December 13, 2019

Abstract

This paper deals with civilian private security in relation to public police. It first elaborates on the specific legal norms that govern public and private security personnel and shows that the rise of private security is not the outcome of privatization in the usual sense of the term. It proceeds to present some facts on private security, a large and fast-growing industry in many countries. The following section deals with the sources of the demand for private security and its impact on security. We show that this impact is conceptually different from that of public police in a constitutional rule of law state. Private security aims at achieving efficient levels of losses from crime. Public police aim at equal protection of citizens against crimes. The different objectives have different consequences on security and on the wealth distribution of citizens. Furthermore, private security usually does not create general deterrence. Also, deployment of security personnel generates crime diversion, which the public police take into consideration, whereas private security has no incentive to do so. We then elaborate on the diverging effects of private versus public security services on the rights of criminal suspects, on the rule of law, and on democratic accountability. The paper concludes with a review of empirical findings on the effectiveness of private security for reducing crime levels, which show significant effects.

Keywords: Private Security, Law and Economics

JEL Classification: H, K, L

Suggested Citation

Schaefer, Hans-Bernd and Fehling, Michael, Privatization of the Police (December 13, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3503424 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3503424

Hans-Bernd Schaefer (Contact Author)

Bucerius Law School ( email )

Jungiusstr. 6
Hamburg, 20355
Germany

University of Hamburg ( email )

Allende-Platz 1
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Michael Fehling

Bucerius Law School ( email )

Jungiusstr. 6
Hamburg, 20355
Germany

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