Manufacturing Discontent: National Institutions, Multinational Firm Strategies, and Anti-Globalization Backlash in Advanced Economies

Global Strategy Journal, Forthcoming

43 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2020

See all articles by Olivier Butzbach

Olivier Butzbach

European University Institute

Douglas B. Fuller

Copenhagen Business School

Gerhard Schnyder

Loughborough University London - Institute for International Management; University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research

Date Written: December 22, 2019

Abstract

There is mounting evidence of a widespread popular backlash against globalization in advanced economies, which can hurt multinational companies’ (MNCs) interests. In this paper we argue that MNCs are both ‘culprits’ and ‘victims’ of backlash against globalization. Building on the comparative capitalism literature, we argue that national institutions influence the likelihood of a backlash by either encouraging MNCs to embrace a “labor arbitrage” strategy consisting in tapping into cheap labor markets overseas or preventing them from doing so. Where institutional constraints lead firms to adopt an “upgrading” route of using domestic workers, popular backlash is less likely. Such institutional factors help to explain variation in the likelihood of backlash across countries. We also discuss the strategic options available to firms facing backlash.

Keywords: anti-globalization, globalization, backlash, varieties of capitalism, VOC, comparative capitalism, Trump, Brexit, inequality, political economy, international business, strategy

JEL Classification: P51, P52, F15, F23

Suggested Citation

Butzbach, Olivier and Fuller, Douglas B. and Schnyder, Gerhard, Manufacturing Discontent: National Institutions, Multinational Firm Strategies, and Anti-Globalization Backlash in Advanced Economies (December 22, 2019). Global Strategy Journal, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508196

Olivier Butzbach

European University Institute ( email )

Badia Fiesolana
Via dei Roccettini 9
I-50016 San Domenico Fiesole, Tuscany 50014
Italy

Douglas B. Fuller (Contact Author)

Copenhagen Business School ( email )

Department of International Economics, Government
Frederiksberg, 2000
Denmark

Gerhard Schnyder

Loughborough University London - Institute for International Management ( email )

Lesney Avenue
Here East
London, E15 2GZ
Great Britain
+44 (0)20 3805 1360 (Phone)

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research ( email )

Judge Business School Building
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
++44 (0)1223 765325 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/people/research-associates/gerhard-schnyder/

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