Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?

48 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2002 Last revised: 24 Dec 2022

See all articles by James R. Barth

James R. Barth

Auburn University; Milken Institute

Gerard Caprio

Williams College

Ross Levine

Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2002

Abstract

This paper uses our new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. The paper examines: (i) regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce; (ii) regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry; (iii) regulations on capital adequacy; (iv) deposit insurance system design features; (v) supervisory power, independence, and resources, (vi) loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines; (vii) regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring of banks; and (viii) government ownership. The results, albeit tentative, raise a cautionary flag regarding government policies that rely excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. The findings instead suggest that policies that rely on guidelines that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, performance and stability.

Suggested Citation

Barth, James R. and Caprio, Gerard and Levine, Ross, Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best? (November 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w9323, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=351423

James R. Barth

Auburn University ( email )

415 West Magnolia Avenue
Auburn, AL 36849
United States
334-844-2469 (Phone)
334-844-4960 (Fax)

Milken Institute ( email )

1250 Fourth Street
Santa Monica, CA 90401
United States

Gerard Caprio

Williams College ( email )

Williamstown, MA 01267
United States
413-597-2465 (Phone)
413-597-4045 (Fax)

Ross Levine (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
220
Abstract Views
3,556
Rank
5,691
PlumX Metrics