Stern School of Business, New York University; New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics
Date Written: 2020
Abstract
Following up on our initial comments at the Tunney Act proceeding of the proposed merger between Sprint and T-Mobile, we discuss DOJ’s criticisms of these comments, explaining why these criticisms are baseless. Moreover, using evidence from the NY v. Deutsche Telecom trial, we provide new arguments showing that the DOJ proposed remedy will fail to restore the ex ante competitive conditions in the affected antitrust product markets to the detriment of users of mobile phones in the United States.
Economides, Nicholas and Kwoka, John E. and Philippon, Thomas and Seamans, Robert and Singer, Hal J. and Steinbaum, Marshall and White, Lawrence J. and White, Lawrence J., Economists’ Tunney Act Reply Comments on the DOJ’s Proposed Remedy in the Sprint/T-Mobile Merger Proceeding (2020). NET Institute Working Paper No. 20-02, 2020, NYU Stern School of Business, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525258 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3525258
New York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series
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