Opposition Media, State Censorship, and Political Accountability: Evidence from Chavez’s Venezuela

Bravo Working Paper # 2020-002

60 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2020

See all articles by Brian G. Knight

Brian G. Knight

Brown University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ana Tribin

Central Bank of Columbia

Date Written: October 7, 2019

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of state censorship of opposition media using evidence from the closing of RCTV, a popular opposition television channel in Venezuela. The government did not renew RCTV’s license, and the channel was replaced overnight, during May 2007, by a pro-government channel. Based upon this censorship of opposition television, we have three key findings. First, using Nielsen ratings data, viewership fell, following the closing of RCTV, on the pro-government replacement, but rose on Globovision, the only remaining television channel for opposition viewers. This finding is consistent with a model in which viewers have a preference for opposition television and substitute accordingly. Second, exploiting the geographic location of the Globovision broadcast towers, Chavez approval ratings fell following the closing of RCTV in places with access to the Globovision signal, relative to places without access. Third, in places with access to the Globovision signal, relative to places without, support for Chavez in electoral data also fell following the closing of RCTV. Counterfactuals, which account for both substitution patterns in media consumption and the persuasive effects of opposition television, document that switching to uncensored outlets led to an economically significant reduction in support for Chavez.

Suggested Citation

Knight, Brian G. and Tribin, Ana, Opposition Media, State Censorship, and Political Accountability: Evidence from Chavez’s Venezuela (October 7, 2019). Bravo Working Paper # 2020-002 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3527005 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3527005

Brian G. Knight (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Ana Tribin

Central Bank of Columbia ( email )

Bogota
Colombia

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