Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay
48 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2020 Last revised: 4 Nov 2021
There are 2 versions of this paper
Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay
Teacher Preferences, Working Conditions, and Compensation Structure
Date Written: February 14, 2020
Abstract
Human-capital formation in school depends largely on the selection and retention of teachers. I use a discrete-choice experiment to examine teacher preferences for compensation structure and working conditions, and I link responses to administrative records on teachers and student achievement. I calculate willingness-to-pay for a rich set of work attributes. High-performing teachers have similar preferences to other teachers, but they have stronger preferences for performance pay. Taking the preference estimates at face value in a model of teacher behavior, I explore how schools would structure compensation to meet various objectives. Under each objective, schools appear to underpay in salary and performance pay while overpaying in retirement. Restructuring compensation can increase both teacher welfare and student achievement.
Keywords: Teachers, Labor Markets, Compensation, Salaries, Pensions, Pay-for-performance, Teacher Selection,Teacher Retention, Class Size
JEL Classification: I20, J32, J45, M50
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation