Naruto v. Slater: One Small Step for a Monkey, One Giant Lawsuit for Animal-Kind

Abstract

When David Slater left his camera unattended in Indonesia, little did he realize the enormous legal battle that would result from that simple act. With a single snap, a “curious male crested black macaque” named Naruto not only captured an iconic photograph, but also managed to jumpstart a legal campaign to assert animals’ rights to sue in federal court and protect their interests in their created works. If successful, the lawsuit would have been the first legal declaration that an animal owned property.

Naruto’s case raised intriguing legal questions and stole the public’s attention. The lawsuit, Naruto v. Slater, even took first place for the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform’s survey of the “Top Ten Most Ridiculous Lawsuits of 2015.” The case has been called “curious,” a “stunt,” and simply “absurd.” But this case, dealing with who owned the resulting “Monkey Selfies” and who could sue to protect those rights, raised intriguing questions about standing for nonhuman entities. It also raised novel questions regarding authorship under the Copyright Act and how creativity is protected in the United States.

This Article will explore the intriguing and unique case of the “Monkey Selfies” and its implications in a variety of legal spheres. In Part II, this Article will examine the standing doctrine in general, as well as the legal status of animal standing prior to the Naruto case. In Part III, this Article will turn to consider the facts and circumstances leading up to the Naruto case, the proceedings in the district court, and the subsequent appeal and opinion. Part III will also analyze the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ criticism of the binding precedent from the case Cetacean Community v. Bush. In Part IV, this Article will consider the legal consequences of the Naruto opinion: the split within the Ninth Circuit, the implications for animal standing in the future, and the impact of Naruto on other nonhuman entities, including the case’s effect on the Copyright Act specifically.

Keywords: Constitutional law, standing, Article III, statutory standing, intellectual property, copyright, animal standing, nonhuman standing, Article III standing, AI, artificial intelligence,