The Dog that Did Not Bark: Limited Price Efficiency and Strategic Nondisclosure

Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 58, Issue 1, March 2020

Posted: 9 Mar 2020

See all articles by Frank Zhou

Frank Zhou

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Yuqing Zhou

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - CUHK Business School

Date Written: March 1, 2020

Abstract

Theory posits that investors can rationally infer the implications of strategic nondisclosure for firm value, pressuring managers to disclose information voluntarily. This study documents that the lack of an earnings guidance predicts an abnormal return of -41 basis points around the subsequent quarterly earnings announcement, suggesting that investors do not fully incorporate the implications of nonguidance. Further analyses demonstrate that limitations in price efficiency, driven by investors' limited attention and short‐selling constraints, explain the mispricing of nonguidance and are associated with less guidance issuance. Our results collectively highlight limited price efficiency as another friction when studying managers' strategic disclosure decisions.

Keywords: mispricing of nonguidance; limited attention; short-selling constraints; voluntary disclosure

JEL Classification: G14; M41

Suggested Citation

Zhou, Frank and Zhou, Yuqing, The Dog that Did Not Bark: Limited Price Efficiency and Strategic Nondisclosure (March 1, 2020). Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 58, Issue 1, March 2020 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538461

Frank Zhou (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Yuqing Zhou

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - CUHK Business School ( email )

Cheng Yu Tung Building
12 Chak Cheung Street
Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong

HOME PAGE: http://www.yuqingzhou.com/

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