Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations

29 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2020

See all articles by Fortuna Casoria

Fortuna Casoria

BSB

Arno Riedl

Maastricht University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Netspar

Peter Werner

Maastricht University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2020

Abstract

This paper reviews experimental studies that investigate the effects of communication on be-havior in organizational settings. Two main classes of studies are identified: (a) studies on coordination and competition, which include experimental research that tests whether com-munication can help to overcome coordination failure within organizations, and (b) studies that analyze the role of communication in alleviating problems arising from information asym-metries at the workplace. The evidence from these studies indicates that communication is suited to improve efficient coordination within firms and to mitigate information problems in employer-employee relationships. In addition, studies are presented that focus on the interac- tion between communication and monetary incentive schemes in companies.

Keywords: communication, organization, experiment, behavior

JEL Classification: C900, D820, D830, J530

Suggested Citation

Casoria, Fortuna and Riedl, Arno M. and Werner, Peter, Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations (2020). CESifo Working Paper No. 8140, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3551807 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551807

Fortuna Casoria (Contact Author)

BSB ( email )

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Lyon, 69008
France

HOME PAGE: http://fortunacasoria.weebly.com

Arno M. Riedl

Maastricht University ( email )

Department of Microeconomics & Public Economics
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.arnoriedl.com

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Germany

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Peter Werner

Maastricht University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

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