The Virus of Fear: The Political Impact of Ebola in the U.S

85 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2020 Last revised: 14 May 2021

See all articles by Filipe Campante

Filipe Campante

Johns Hopkins University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Emilio Depetris-Chauvín

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Ruben Durante

National University Singapore; Barcelona School of Economics; IZA; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2020

Abstract

We study how negative emotions can affect the behavior of voters and politicians by looking at the Ebola scare that hit the U.S. right before the 2014 midterm elections. Exploiting the timing and location of the four cases diagnosed in the U.S., we show that heightened concern about Ebola led to a lower vote share for the Democrats, as well as lower turnout, despite no evidence of a general anti-incumbent effect (including for President Obama). We then show that Republican politicians exploited the Ebola scare strategically by mentioning the disease in connection with immigration, terrorism, and President Obama. Voters responded with increased concern with Ebola, and increasingly conservative attitudes on immigration but not on other ideologically-charged issues. Our findings indicate that emotional reactions can have a strong electoral impact, that politicians perceive and respond strategically, and that this is mediated by issues that can be plausibly associated with the specific triggering factor.

JEL Classification: D72, D91

Suggested Citation

Campante, Filipe and Depetris-Chauvín, Emilio and Durante, Ruben, The Virus of Fear: The Political Impact of Ebola in the U.S (March 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14518, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3560326

Filipe Campante (Contact Author)

Johns Hopkins University ( email )

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Emilio Depetris-Chauvín

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile ( email )

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Chile

Ruben Durante

National University Singapore ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://www.rubendurante.net

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

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Spain

IZA ( email )

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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