Reinforcing the Efficiency of Public Procurement

12 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2020

See all articles by Stéphane Saussier

Stéphane Saussier

IAE - University of Paris I Sorbonne

Jean Tirole

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: April 1, 2015

Abstract

P ublic procurement, the generic term used to refer to stage and the execution stage (renegotiation). We believe procurement contracts (traditional procurement), public service delegations (including concessions) and public private partnerships, currently represents today significant amounts of money as it is believed to account for nearly 15% of the GDP in France. Whilst the public pro- curement system must strive to achieve the best possible performance in terms of cost and service, its inefficiency is highlighted on a regular basis. In (actual) fact, subs- tantial gains could be achieved through a more efficient management of the system. The present Note examines potential avenues of action, in the framework of the regulatory changes currently under way at European level, with the aim of increasing the efficiency of the public procure- ment system.

The contracts upon which the public procurement system is based are subject to certain asymmetries of information (in that the company is more familiar with its costs and the economic environment than the public party) and contrac- tual incompleteness (since it is impossible to foresee every possible event that might arise during the execution of the contract). This being the case, the economic analy- sis recommends that competitive forces be used where- ver possible when it comes to selecting partners and that incentive mechanisms be put in place to establish a real commitment of the parties concerned.

New European Directives regarding procurement contracts and concessions, approved in 2014 and expected to be transposed by 2016, will give public authorities greater flexibility to negotiate with companies at both the selection this change to be a positive and economically justified one. It is, however, crucial that it be supported by specific terms governing its management that are not currently outlined in the Directives. Our recommendations are based on three key avenues, namely transparency, competition and expertise.

The negotiation procedure must be supported by transpa- rent information both prior to and following negotiation. During the execution stage, it must be possible for amend- ments to contracts to be contested without debilitating the process by facilitating an increase in the number of futile appeals. We also put forward a number of recom- mendations designed to encourage greater transparency where public procurement is concerned.

For the purposes of intensifying competition at the tendering stage it would be useful to limit the number of elec- tronic information platforms and to merge them towards a high-performance standardised model. At the same time, it is advisable to simplify procedures, to increase the pro- fessionalisation of public buyers and to centralise the most standard of purchases in order to benefit from eco- nomies of scale and pool the experience of public buyers.

Finally, with regards to large-scale projects, we would recommend that a comparative evaluation be performed beforehand in order to determine the most appropriate public procurement tool to meet the needs of the public authorities concerned. The agency responsible for this prior evaluation would also perform ex post evaluations with a view to drawing lessons regarding the various tools and procedures available.

Keywords: public procurement

Suggested Citation

Saussier, Stephane and Tirole, Jean, Reinforcing the Efficiency of Public Procurement (April 1, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562719 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3562719

Stephane Saussier (Contact Author)

IAE - University of Paris I Sorbonne ( email )

21, Rue Broca
Paris, 75005
France

Jean Tirole

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) ( email )

Place Anatole France
21 Allees de Brienne
F-31042 Toulouse Cedex
France
+33 5 61 12 8642 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 8637 (Fax)

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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