Compromising on Compromise Rules
29 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2020 Last revised: 26 Sep 2022
Date Written: June 1, 2021
Abstract
We propose three mechanisms to reach a compromise between two opposite parties that must choose one out of a set of candidates and operate under full information. All three mechanisms weakly implement the Unanimity Compromise Set. They all rely on the use of some Rule of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist of k candidates, from which the opposite party selects the one to appoint. The decision regarding which particular rule in the class will be used involves determining who will submit the shortlist and the size of k. The chosen rule results endogenously from the strategic interaction between the parties, rather than being imposed a priori by any exogenous convention.
Keywords: The Unanimity Compromise Set, Compromise Rule of k Names, Shortlisting Contest, Alternate Shortlists, Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes, Fallback Bargaining.
JEL Classification: D02, D71, D72l
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation