Compromising on Compromise Rules

29 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2020 Last revised: 26 Sep 2022

See all articles by Salvador Barberà

Salvador Barberà

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; MOVE; Barcelona School of Economics

Danilo Santa Cruz Coelho

IPEA - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada

Date Written: June 1, 2021

Abstract

We propose three mechanisms to reach a compromise between two opposite parties that must choose one out of a set of candidates and operate under full information. All three mechanisms weakly implement the Unanimity Compromise Set. They all rely on the use of some Rule of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist of k candidates, from which the opposite party selects the one to appoint. The decision regarding which particular rule in the class will be used involves determining who will submit the shortlist and the size of k. The chosen rule results endogenously from the strategic interaction between the parties, rather than being imposed a priori by any exogenous convention.

Keywords: The Unanimity Compromise Set, Compromise Rule of k Names, Shortlisting Contest, Alternate Shortlists, Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes, Fallback Bargaining.

JEL Classification: D02, D71, D72l

Suggested Citation

Barberà, Salvador and Coelho, Danilo Santa Cruz, Compromising on Compromise Rules (June 1, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567049 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3567049

Salvador Barberà

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelolna 08193
Spain
34935811814 (Phone)
34935812012 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera/

MOVE ( email )

Campus de Bellaterra-UAB Edifici B (s/n)
EDIFICI B
Cerdanyola del Vallès
, Barcelona 08193
Spain
34935812188 (Phone)
34935812012 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.movebarcelona.eu/

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://bse.eu/

Danilo Santa Cruz Coelho (Contact Author)

IPEA - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada ( email )

SBS QD 1 BLOCO J ED BNDES
SALA 1409
BRASILIA, Distrito Federal 70076900
Brazil

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