Download This PaperCongressional Securities Trading
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, April 2020
3 Pages Posted: 5 May 2020 Last revised: 4 Oct 2022
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Congressional Securities Trading
Date Written: April 23, 2020
Abstract
This piece expands upon the argument made in Gregory H. Shill, Congressional Securities Trading, 96 Indiana Law Journal 313 (2020) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3570314). Using trades executed by two Senators during the COVID-19 pandemic as a springboard, it proposes a taxonomy of congressional securities trading more generally, situates the Senators’ conduct within it, and develops a novel, comprehensive prescription to manage it. In particular, it urges a primarily regulatory rather than litigation and enforcement approach for managing securities trading by Members of Congress. To develop this, it proposes adaptations from the model in use for public company insiders.
The paper this post is based on can be found at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570314
Keywords: securities regulation, pandemic, COVID-19, coronavirus, insider trading, congressional insider trading, Rule 10b-5, 10b5-1, short-swing profits rule, Section 16, Regulation Fair Disclosure, STOCK Act, Kelly Loeffler, Richard Burr, pandemic trading
JEL Classification: K00, K10, K20, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation