Voluntary Disclosure when Private Information and Disclosure Costs are Jointly Determined
Review of Accounting Studies, forthcoming
47 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2020 Last revised: 29 Dec 2021
Date Written: April 1, 2020
Abstract
Classical models of voluntary disclosure feature two economic forces: the existence of an adverse selection problem (e.g., a manager possesses some private information) and the cost of ameliorating the problem (e.g., costs associated with disclosure). Traditionally these forces are modelled independently. In this paper, we use a simple model to motivate empirical predictions in a setting where these forces are jointly determined––where greater adverse selection entails greater costs of disclosure. We show that joint determination of these forces generates a pronounced non-linearity in the probability of voluntary disclosure. We find that this non-linearity is empirically descriptive of multiple measures of voluntary disclosure in two distinct empirical settings that are commonly thought to feature both private information and proprietary costs: capital investments and sales to major customers.
Keywords: voluntary disclosure; adverse selection; private information; disclosure costs; proprietary costs; capital investment; major customers
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