Innovation In Spectrum Repurposing: The C-Band As A Principal-Agent Problem

15 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2020

See all articles by Thomas Randolph Beard

Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics

George S. Ford

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Michael Stern

Auburn University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 1, 2019

Abstract

A consortium of satellite service providers have proposed to repurpose by private sale a large portion of a 500 MHz swath of mid-band spectrum known as the C-Band. As is common, the plan faces some resistance, with much of the opposition preferring a public auction rather than a private sale. In this BULLETIN, we evaluate the competing methods for repurposing the band by appealing to principal-agent theory where the government is the principal and the consortium of satellite incumbents is the agent. Our analysis demonstrates the following: First, given the private information available to the satellite industry, it makes sense for the government to allow the consortium to serve as an agent in conducting the sale, thereby ensuring the rapid and efficacious repurposing of the band. Second, compensation to the agent for its private information is efficient and not “unjust enrichment.” Third, considering the possibility that the principal may demand compensation from the agent, any such compensation (i.e., a regulatory payment) should take the form of a fixed payment rather than a share of auction proceeds. Fourth, while a public auction may be used to increase the government’s proceeds from repurposing the band, such enrichment is more than matched by a reduction in total economic welfare. Finally, our use of the C-Band as a case study in this paper does not restrict our analysis to the C-Band. If the CBA implements a private sale to repurpose large blocks of mid-band spectrum, then the Commission may use other incumbents as agents to efficiently repurpose other spectrum bands. Just as spectrum auctions were an important innovation in U.S. spectrum policy, conducting auctions or other similar transactions through private agents may be a sensible next step in the efficient allocation and assignment of spectrum rights.

Keywords: telecommunications, spectrum, C-band, principal-agent model

JEL Classification: L96

Suggested Citation

Beard, Thomas Randolph and Ford, George S. and Stern, Michael, Innovation In Spectrum Repurposing: The C-Band As A Principal-Agent Problem (September 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3608434 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3608434

Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )

415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States

George S. Ford (Contact Author)

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States

Michael Stern

Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )

Auburn, AL 36849
United States

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