Public Wrongs and Public Reason

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, Volume 55, Issue 1, pp. 45-58, (March 2016), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217315000074

Posted: 3 Jun 2020

See all articles by Chad Flanders

Chad Flanders

Saint Louis University - School of Law

Date Written: June 1, 2020

Abstract

The distinction between crimes that involve wrongs in themselves and crimes that are wrong because the law makes them so has long puzzled theorists. This essay argues that the distinction, while getting at something real, is based on a mistake. That mistake is made both by those who see moral wrongness as a necessary condition for criminality and by those who believe merely making something illegal is sufficient to make it criminal. Neither is correct. Rather, what makes something a criminal wrong is that it involves a violation of a law that has been justified in terms of “public reason.”

Suggested Citation

Flanders, Chad, Public Wrongs and Public Reason (June 1, 2020). Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, Volume 55, Issue 1, pp. 45-58, (March 2016), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217315000074, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3616448

Chad Flanders (Contact Author)

Saint Louis University - School of Law ( email )

100 N. Tucker Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63101
United States

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