Extreme Leaders As Negotiation Anchors

61 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2020 Last revised: 22 Apr 2022

See all articles by Richard J. Zeckhauser

Richard J. Zeckhauser

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David C. King

Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Benjamin Schneer

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: April 2022

Abstract

Legislative leaders tend to be ideologically more extreme than their median members. Why? This paper shows that party members select extreme leaders as a strategic measure to anchor negotiations. Anchoring succeeds because the opposition understands that such leaders will not compromise on moderate legislation. Hence, rank-and-file members balance their own ideologies, and their assessments of political feasibility and institutional conditions, to select leaders who will pull agreements towards the ideal point of their median party member. Congressional voting data since 1900 confirms this account. When parties have selected extreme leaders, passed legislation aligns more closely with the preferences of the median caucus member. Party members also acknowledge the benefits of extreme leaders, referring to them more positively in newsletters sent to constituents. Such extremeness has the consequence, however, that less legislation gets passed. Additional comparative statics align with an account where institutional conditions can constrain the extremeness of leaders selected.

Suggested Citation

Zeckhauser, Richard J. and King, David C. and Schneer, Benjamin, Extreme Leaders As Negotiation Anchors (April 2022). HKS Working Paper No. RWP20-015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3622301 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3622301

Richard J. Zeckhauser (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

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David C. King

Harvard Kennedy School of Government ( email )

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Benjamin Schneer

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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