Public Debt in the United States and Germany: A Constitutional Perspective

29 Conn. J. Int'l L. 71 (2013)

42 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2020

See all articles by Stephen Utz

Stephen Utz

University of Connecticut School of Law

Markus Heintzen

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Law

Date Written: September 1, 2013

Abstract

This article compares how German and American constitutional frameworks shape alternative approaches for legislative self-discipline regarding public debt. The comparison identifies structural features of the respective constitutional régimes that work with or against long-term budgetary discipline on the part of a national legislature. The authors conclude that the details details of this globally pressing legislative goal require a legislative perspective that is sensitive to both constitutional and fiscal challenges.

Keywords: public debt, constitutional restrictions on public debt, fiscal and tax consequences of public debt

Suggested Citation

Utz, Stephen G. and Heintzen, Markus, Public Debt in the United States and Germany: A Constitutional Perspective (September 1, 2013). 29 Conn. J. Int'l L. 71 (2013), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3634087

Stephen G. Utz (Contact Author)

University of Connecticut School of Law ( email )

65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
United States
(860) 570-5235 (Phone)
(860) 570-5242 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uconn.edu/faculty/sutz/

Markus Heintzen

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Law ( email )

Boltzmannstr. 3
Berlin, 14195
Germany

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