Can Security Design Foster Household Risk-Taking?

111 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2020 Last revised: 16 Aug 2020

See all articles by Laurent E. Calvet

Laurent E. Calvet

SKEMA Business School; CEPR

Claire Célérier

University of Toronto

Paolo Sodini

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance; Swedish House of Finance

Boris Vallee

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2020

Abstract

This paper shows that securities with a non-linear payoff design can foster household risk-taking. We demonstrate this effect empirically by exploiting the introduction of capital guarantee products in Sweden from 2002 to 2007. The fast and broad adoption of these products is associated with an increase in expected financial portfolio returns, which is especially strong for households with a low risk appetite ex ante. We explore possible economic explanations by developing a life-cycle model of consumption-portfolio decisions. The capital guarantee substantially increases risk-taking by households with pessimistic beliefs or preferences combining loss aversion and narrow framing. The welfare gains from financial innovation are stronger for households that are less willing to take risk ex ante. Our results illustrate how security design can mitigate behavioral biases and enhance economic well-being.

Keywords: behavioral biases, capital guarantee product, household finance, risk-taking, security design

JEL Classification: D12, D18, G1, I22

Suggested Citation

Calvet, Laurent E. and Célérier, Claire and Sodini, Paolo and Vallee, Boris, Can Security Design Foster Household Risk-Taking? (June 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14955, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3638060

Laurent E. Calvet (Contact Author)

SKEMA Business School ( email )

5 Quai Marcel Dassault
Suresnes, 92150
France

CEPR ( email )

33 Great Sutton Street
London, EC1V 0DX
United Kingdom

Claire Célérier

University of Toronto ( email )

105 St George Street
Toronto, M5S 3G8
Canada

Paolo Sodini

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

Sveavagen 65, Box 6501
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
46 8 7369165 (Phone)
46 8 312327 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hhs.se/secfi/People/Faculty/Finpso/finp

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Boris Vallee

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States

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