Political Orientation and Adherence to Social Distancing During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy

25 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2020 Last revised: 16 Mar 2021

See all articles by Paolo Barbieri

Paolo Barbieri

Prometeia - AMIF; University of Bologna - Department of Economics; University of Gothenburg - Centre for Health Economics

Beatrice Bonini

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan - Osservatorio sui Conti Pubblici Italiani

Date Written: July 12, 2020

Abstract

Many governments have implemented social distancing and lockdown measures to curb the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19). Using province-level geolocation data from Italy, we document that political disbelief can limit government policy effectiveness. Residents in provinces leaning towards extreme right-wing parties show lower rates of compliance with social distancing order. We also find that, during the Italian lockdown, provinces with high protest votes virtually disregarded all social distancing orders. On the contrary, in provinces with higher political support for the current political legislation, we found a higher degree of social distancing compliance. These results are robust to controlling for other factors, including time, geography, local COVID-19 cases and deaths, healthcare hospital beds, and other sociodemographic and economic characteristics. Our research shows that bipartisan support and national responsibility are essential to implement and manage social distancing efficiently. From a broader perspective, our findings suggest that partisan politics and discontent with the political class (i.e., protest voting) might significantly affect human health and the economy.

Keywords: COVID-19, Coronavirus, Political belief, Protest vote, Geolocation data

JEL Classification: P16, C55, H7

Suggested Citation

Barbieri, Paolo and Bonini, Beatrice, Political Orientation and Adherence to Social Distancing During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy (July 12, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3640324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3640324

Paolo Barbieri (Contact Author)

Prometeia - AMIF ( email )

Piazza Trento e Trieste, 3
Bologna, Bologna 40137
Italy

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40100
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/paolonbarbieri/home

University of Gothenburg - Centre for Health Economics ( email )

Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden

Beatrice Bonini

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan - Osservatorio sui Conti Pubblici Italiani

Largo Agostino Gemelli 1
Milan
Italy

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