Like Stars: How Firms Learn at Scientific Conferences

64 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2020 Last revised: 29 Sep 2022

See all articles by Stefano Baruffaldi

Stefano Baruffaldi

Polytechnic University of Milan - Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Felix Poege

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 14, 2022

Abstract

Scientific conferences are an underexplored channel by which firms learn from science. Although attendance per se may be sufficient to lower search costs in relation to scientific knowledge, we show that active participation and corporate investments in reputation are necessary to establish the personal connections that act as the key learning channel. Using data from conference papers in computer science since the 1990s, we show that corporate investments in participation are both frequent and highly skewed, some firms contributing to a given conference scientifically, some as sponsors, and some doing both. We use direct flights as an instrumental variable for the probability that other scientists participate in the same conference as a firm and find that this increases the firm’s use of the scientists’ knowledge. However, the most significant benefits accrue if the firm seeks the spotlight by both sponsoring the conference and taking part in its scientific discourse. Additional analyses show that these efforts foretell research collaborations and suggest that participation is more relevant in circumstances where the conference helps to trigger personal interactions, even when knowledge search costs are otherwise low.

Keywords: Conferences, Corporate Science, Scientists

JEL Classification: O33, O32, D22

Suggested Citation

Baruffaldi, Stefano and Pöge, Felix, Like Stars: How Firms Learn at Scientific Conferences (July 14, 2022). Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 20-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3644106 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3644106

Stefano Baruffaldi

Polytechnic University of Milan - Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering ( email )

Via Lambruschini 4C - building 26/A
Milano, 20156
Italy

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Felix Pöge (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
243
Abstract Views
2,031
Rank
194,328
PlumX Metrics