The Market for CEOs

57 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2020 Last revised: 22 Jun 2022

See all articles by Peter Cziraki

Peter Cziraki

Texas A&M University - Department of Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Dirk Jenter

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 6, 2020

Abstract

We study the market for CEOs of large publicly-traded US firms, analyze new CEOs’ prior connections to the hiring firm, and explore how hiring choices are determined. Firms are hiring from a surprisingly small pool of candidates. More than 80% of new CEOs are insiders, defined as current or former employees or board members. Boards are already familiar with more than 90% of new CEOs, as they are either insiders or executives who directors have previously worked with. There are few reallocations of CEOs across firms – firms raid CEOs of other firms in only 3% of cases. Pay differences appear too small to explain these hiring choices. The evidence suggests that firm-specific human capital, asymmetric information, and other frictions have first-order effects on the assignment of CEOs to firms.

Keywords: CEO labor markets, CEO-firm matching, assignment models, CEO turnover, CEO compensation

JEL Classification: G30, G34, M12

Suggested Citation

Cziraki, Peter and Jenter, Dirk, The Market for CEOs (July 6, 2020). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 831/2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3644496 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3644496

Peter Cziraki

Texas A&M University - Department of Finance ( email )

430 Wehner
College Station, TX 77843-4218
United States
979 845 1136 (Phone)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Dirk Jenter (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance ( email )

United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/jenter/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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