Non-Selfish Behavior: Are Social Preferences or Social Norms Revealed in Distribution Decisions?

People frequently choose to reduce own payoffs to help others. This non-selfish behavior is typically assumed to arise because people are motivated by social preferences. An alternative explanation is that they follow social norms. We test which of these two accounts can better explain subjects' decisions in a simple distribution game. Unlike previous studies, we elicit preferences and perceived norms directly for each subject. We find that norm-following explains people's distributive choices better than social preferences, and lack of confidence in one's social preference predicts norm-following. Our finding have implications for the strength of the Pareto criterion in welfare evaluations.

Keywords: Social Preferences, Norms, Distribution Decisions, Inequality, Unselfishness, Social Identity, Ambiguity, Principles of Justice, Pareto Criterion, Maximin

JEL Classification: A13, C90, D63, D64, D91, Z13

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Hargreaves Heap, Shaun and Matakos, Konstantinos and Weber, Nina, Non-Selfish Behavior: Are Social Preferences or Social Norms Revealed in Distribution Decisions? (July 21, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3657431 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3657431