The Nature of the Fintech Firm and its Implications for Financial Regulation

18 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2020

Date Written: July 15, 2020

Abstract

This chapter explores recent Fintech innovations through the lens of Ronald Coase’s classic article: The Nature of the Firm. Applying a transaction cost analysis, the chapter argues that developments in computer technology, data processing, and information networks are reshaping the manner in which financial services are produced, unsettling the boundaries separating regulated firms from outside vendors and open market transactions. These changes raise challenging questions as to the appropriate contours of regulatory perimeters as well as the structure of regulation and supervision in the many area of financial regulation. Fintech innovations also have the potential to be harnessed to serve public purposes, including expanding access to financial services and improving supervisory practices. At a minimum, Fintech innovations and most especially machine learning and artificial intelligence complicate the application of legal doctrines based on human intentionality. More broadly, the scale and scope of these technological developments may lead to a fundamentally rethinking of the appropriate goals of regulatory policy for financial firms and the economy more broadly, particularly with respect to privacy and the accumulation of personal information in private and public hands.

Keywords: Fintech, Financial Regulation, Consumer Protection, Consumer Finance, Investor Protection, Systemic Risk, Regulatory Design

JEL Classification: A11, D11, D18, D40, G02, G18, G20, G28, K22, K23

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Howell Edmunds, The Nature of the Fintech Firm and its Implications for Financial Regulation (July 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3659503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3659503

Howell Edmunds Jackson (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Griswald 402
1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5466 (Phone)
617-495-5156 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
269
Abstract Views
1,040
Rank
208,588
PlumX Metrics