Window Dressing in the Public Sector: A Case Study of China's Compulsory Education Promotion Program

45 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2020 Last revised: 29 Jun 2023

See all articles by Hanming Fang

Hanming Fang

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Chang Liu

Princeton University

Li-An Zhou

Peking University - Guanghua School of Management

Date Written: July 2020

Abstract

We examine window dressing phenomenon in the public sector by studying the strategic responses of Chinese local officials to the compulsory education promotion program launched by the central government in the 1990s. According to this program, the Chinese counties should receive inspections on whether the compulsory educational targets were achieved on pre-scheduled time by provincial governments; and failing to pass the inspection would have severe negative career consequences for the county leaders. We find that county-level educational expenditures saw a sustained increase before the inspection, but a sharp drop immediately after the inspection. Local officials who were more likely to be inspected within their tenures window-dressed more aggressively. As a result, middle school enrollment rates declined significantly after the inspection, and rural girls bore the blunt of the decline in school enrollment.

Suggested Citation

Fang, Hanming and Liu, Chang and Zhou, Li-An, Window Dressing in the Public Sector: A Case Study of China's Compulsory Education Promotion Program (July 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27628, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665899

Hanming Fang (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Chang Liu

Princeton University ( email )

22 Chambers Street
Princeton, NJ 08544-0708
United States

Li-An Zhou

Peking University - Guanghua School of Management ( email )

Peking University
Beijing, Beijing 100871
China

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
27
Abstract Views
383
PlumX Metrics