Experimental Effects of an Absent Crowd on Performances and Refereeing Decisions During Covid-19

22 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2020 Last revised: 16 Apr 2023

See all articles by Alex Bryson

Alex Bryson

UCL ; National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR)

Peter Dolton

University of London - Institute of Education; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

James Reade

University of Reading

Dominik Schreyer

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Carl Singleton

University of Stirling - School of Management

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Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic has induced worldwide natural experiments on the effects of crowds. We exploit one of these experiments currently taking place over several countries in almost identical settings: professional football matches played behind closed doors. We find large and statistically significant effects on the number of yellow cards issued by referees. Without a crowd, fewer cards were awarded to the away teams, reducing home advantage. These results have implications for the influence of social pressure and crowds on the neutrality of refereeing decisions.

Keywords: referee bias, natural experiments, home advantage, COVID-19, Coronavirus, attendance, social pressure

JEL Classification: C90, D91, L83, Z20

Suggested Citation

Bryson, Alex and Dolton, Peter and Reade, James and Schreyer, Dominik and Singleton, Carl, Experimental Effects of an Absent Crowd on Performances and Refereeing Decisions During Covid-19. IZA Discussion Paper No. 13578, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3669507 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3669507

Alex Bryson (Contact Author)

UCL ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://iris.ucl.ac.uk/iris/browse/profile?upi=ABRYS65

National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) ( email )

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Peter Dolton

University of London - Institute of Education ( email )

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+44 (0)207 612 6880 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Germany

James Reade

University of Reading ( email )

Dominik Schreyer

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

Carl Singleton

University of Stirling - School of Management ( email )

Stirling, FK9 4LA
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.carlsingletoneconomics.com/

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