The Effect of Lead VC Presence on the Probability and Outcome of Merger-Related Litigation
Posted: 27 Oct 2020
Date Written: June 20, 2020
Abstract
Employing a sample of 697 M&A offers for VC-backed IPO companies from 1996 to 2018, we find that takeover bids that occur in the presence of lead VCs command a higher initial premium and are less likely to be legally contested compared to bids for companies from which the lead VC has already exited. In addition, these companies enjoy higher stock price returns in response to the M&A announcement and muted price declines around the litigation date. We also document the importance of several lead VC characteristics in determining their portfolio companies’ litigation risk.
Keywords: M&A Offers, Merger-Related Litigation, Venture Capitalists, Takeover Premium
JEL Classification: G24, G34, K41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation