The Authoritarian Trade-off: A Synthetic Control Analysis of Development and Social Compliance in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region

49 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2020 Last revised: 21 Oct 2022

See all articles by Linan Peng

Linan Peng

Depauw University - Department of Economics and Management

Justin T Callais

University of Louisiana at Lafayette - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: September 21, 2020

Abstract

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has recently experienced a series of policies sought to bring economic development, as well as intensive methods of social coercion. A unique leader, Chen Quanguo, brought these changes in the XUAR in 2016. This paper seeks to examine the effects of Chen’s regime. Figuring out if the policies brought forth by Chen actually had any significant change in development and social coercion is complicated, mainly due to the fact it is impossible to examine the XUAR with and without the regime of Chen. Using the synthetic control method, however, is one way of addressing if Chen had any meaningful effect on the region by constructing a counterfactual that seeks to mimic what would have happened to XUAR had Chen not been put in power. We specifically examine three outcomes: GDP per capita, arrest rates, and spending on public security. Our findings suggest that Chen had no significant effect on the development, but his policies led to much higher rates of arrest and larger spending on public security.

Keywords: Xinjiang, regional development, China, Synthetic Control Method, religious persecution

JEL Classification: K38, K42, P37, R11

Suggested Citation

Peng, Linan and Callais, Justin, The Authoritarian Trade-off: A Synthetic Control Analysis of Development and Social Compliance in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (September 21, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3696884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3696884

Linan Peng

Depauw University - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Greencastle, IN 46135
United States

Justin Callais (Contact Author)

University of Louisiana at Lafayette - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Lafayette, LA 70504
United States

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