Conditionality vs. Autonomy: What Works Best in Social Assistance?

68 Pages Posted: 31 Dec 2020 Last revised: 24 Sep 2023

See all articles by Timo Verlaat

Timo Verlaat

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis; Utrecht University - School of Economics

Stephanie Rosenkranz

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Loek F. M. Groot

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Mark Sanders

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Date Written: June 21, 2021

Abstract

We study the impacts of reducing conditionality for social assistance recipients through a field experiment in the Netherlands. Treated subjects received an exemption from job search requirements, monitoring, and sanctions or intensive counseling personalized to their needs and wishes. We find that exemption increases the probabilities of employment and self-sufficiency and improves reemployment quality. The effects of counseling are less pronounced and statistically insignificant. Using surveys, we find positive effects on experienced autonomy but no evidence of effects on job search behavior, social participation, health, and well-being. Our findings shed new light on the trade-off between autonomy and conditionality in social welfare.

Keywords: Welfare, RCT, Minimum Income Guarantee, Social Assistance, Policy Evaluation

JEL Classification: C93, I38, J64

Suggested Citation

Verlaat, Timo and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Groot, Loek F. M. and Sanders, Mark, Conditionality vs. Autonomy: What Works Best in Social Assistance? (June 21, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3720953 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3720953

Timo Verlaat (Contact Author)

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis ( email )

P.O. Box 80510
2508 GM The Hague, 2585 JR
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.cpb.nl/medewerkers/timo-verlaat

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, 3584 EC
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uu.nl/medewerkers/TLLVerlaat

Stephanie Rosenkranz

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, 3584 EC
Netherlands
+31 30 253 9806 (Phone)
+31 30 253 7373 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/defaculteit/persoonlijkepagi/rosenkranz/

Loek F. M. Groot

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, 3584 EC
Netherlands

Mark Sanders

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, 3584 EC
Netherlands

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