Political Differences in Air Pollution Abatement Under the Clean Air Act

51 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2021 Last revised: 23 May 2022

See all articles by Zach Raff

Zach Raff

USDA Economic Research Service

Andrew Meyer

Marquette University - Department of Economics

Jason M. Walter

University of Tulsa

Date Written: November 10, 2020

Abstract

In this paper, we study how local politics affect state level implementation of a critical federal environmental policy, the Clean Air Act, in the electricity generation sector. The analysis focuses on the installation of capital intensive air pollution abatement technology in highly regulated “nonattainment” areas, which violate federal air quality standards. The research design uses a regression discontinuity in the vote share for Republican governors and event study analyses of close elections. In nonattainment areas, Republican gubernatorial control differentially decreases new air pollution abatement capital spending by 90% and the probability of installing the most effective nitro-gen oxide abatement technology by nine percentage points, relative to attainment areas and the counterfactual of Democratic gubernatorial control. The health benefits from reduced nitrogen oxide emissions in nonattainment areas likely exceed the additional costs of new air pollution abatement technology at electric utilities. However, the estimated benefit-cost ratios are smaller than those from many other air pollution abatement policies and net benefits may be negative for technology that will operate for fewer than five years.

Keywords: abatement technology, close elections, Clean Air Act, electric utilities

JEL Classification: K23, L51, Q53, Q58, R11

Suggested Citation

Raff, Zach and Meyer, Andrew and Walter, Jason M., Political Differences in Air Pollution Abatement Under the Clean Air Act (November 10, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3728705 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3728705

Zach Raff

USDA Economic Research Service ( email )

355 E Street SW
Washington, DC 20024-3221
United States

Andrew Meyer (Contact Author)

Marquette University - Department of Economics ( email )

1530 W. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53233
United States
414-288-5489 (Phone)

Jason M. Walter

University of Tulsa ( email )

Tulsa, OK 74104
United States

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