Institutional Quality Causes Social Trust: Evidence from Survey and Experimental Data on Trusting Under the Shadow of Doubt

CeCAR Working Paper Series No. 10

Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-04

42 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2020

See all articles by Andrea FM Martinangeli

Andrea FM Martinangeli

Burgundy School of Business; University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR)

Marina Povitkina

Göteborg University, Department of Political Science, Students

Sverker C. Jagers

University of Gothenburg - Department of Political Science

Bo Rothstein

University of Gothenburg

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: Dece 1, 2020

Abstract

Social trust is a crucial ingredient for successful collective action. What causes social trust to develop, however, remains poorly understood. The quality of political institutions has been proposed as a candidate driver and has been shown to correlate with social trust. We show that this relationship is causal. We begin by documenting a positive correlation between quality of institutions, measured by embezzlement, and social trust using survey data. We then take the investigation to the laboratory: We first exogenously expose subjects to different levels of institutional quality in an environment mimicking public administration embezzlement. We then measure social trust among the participants using a trust game. Coherent with our survey evidence, individuals exposed to low institutional quality trust significantly less.

Keywords: Social trust, quality of government, corruption

JEL Classification: D63, D73

Suggested Citation

Martinangeli, Andrea and Povitkina, Marina and Jagers, Sverker C. and Rothstein, Bo, Institutional Quality Causes Social Trust: Evidence from Survey and Experimental Data on Trusting Under the Shadow of Doubt (Dece 1, 2020). CeCAR Working Paper Series No. 10, Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3744618 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3744618

Andrea Martinangeli (Contact Author)

Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 Rue Sambin
Dijon, 21000
France

University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR) ( email )

Box 100, S-405 30
Gothenburg
Sweden

Marina Povitkina

Göteborg University, Department of Political Science, Students ( email )

Box 711
Göteborg
Sweden

Sverker C. Jagers

University of Gothenburg - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 711
Göteborg, S-405 30
Sweden

Bo Rothstein

University of Gothenburg ( email )

Box 711
Gothenburg, SE 40530
Sweden
+46317864599 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.pol.gu.se/Person.asp?PersonId=82

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