Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

37 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2003

See all articles by Stephen Morris

Stephen Morris

MIT

Takashi Ui

Yokohama National University - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 2003

Abstract

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions and shows that the sufficient conditions generalize the existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria.

Keywords: Incomplete Information, Potential, Refinements, Robustness

JEL Classification: C72, D82

Suggested Citation

Morris, Stephen Edward and Ui, Takashi, Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria (January 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=374860

Stephen Edward Morris (Contact Author)

MIT ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.mit.edu/faculty/semorris

Takashi Ui

Yokohama National University - Department of Economics ( email )

79-3 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku
Yokohama 240-8501
Japan