Artificial Intelligence and Anticompetitive Collusion: From the ‘Meeting of Minds’ Towards the ‘Meeting of Algorithms’?

TTLF Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 74, forthcoming in M. Ebers, C. Poncibò, M. Zou (eds.) “Contracting and Contract Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”, Hart Publishing, 2022

17 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2021 Last revised: 27 Aug 2021

See all articles by Giuseppe Colangelo

Giuseppe Colangelo

Università degli Studi della Basilicata; Stanford Law School; LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management; International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE)

Date Written: May 27, 2021

Abstract

Information technologies has affected so many aspects of daily life that algorithmic society is not considered science fiction anymore. When it comes to marketplaces and business strategies, it has been observed that a growing number of firms are using algorithms for dynamic price setting, thereby automatically adjusting their prices to changes in market conditions, including rivals’ prices. As a result, the diffusion of algorithmic pricing raises concerns for competition policy about the potential to enable collusion. Further, some policy makers and scholars are questioning the ability of existing antitrust tools to tackle effectively this new form of collusion. Indeed, current antitrust rules have been designed to deal with human facilitation of coordination requiring some form of mutual understanding among firms (‘meeting of the minds’). However, according to a strand of literature, algorithms could coordinate independently of human intervention and even autonomously learn to collude. Against this background, the paper aims at investigating whether current antitrust rules are suited to facing these new challenges, whether algorithmic interactions (‘meeting of algorithms’) could be treated similarly to a ‘meeting of minds’ or whether new regulatory tools are needed.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Algorithms; Antitrust; Collusion

JEL Classification: D43; L13; L41

Suggested Citation

Colangelo, Giuseppe, Artificial Intelligence and Anticompetitive Collusion: From the ‘Meeting of Minds’ Towards the ‘Meeting of Algorithms’? (May 27, 2021). TTLF Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 74, forthcoming in M. Ebers, C. Poncibò, M. Zou (eds.) “Contracting and Contract Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”, Hart Publishing, 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3751255 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3751255

Giuseppe Colangelo (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi della Basilicata ( email )

Via dell'Ateneo Lucano 10
Potenza
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/home

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.stanford.edu/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/

LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Roma 00197
Italy

International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) ( email )

5005 SW Meadows Rd.
Suite 300
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
266
Abstract Views
927
Rank
209,128
PlumX Metrics