Welfare Transitions in the 1990s: The Economy, Welfare Policy, and the EITC

40 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2003 Last revised: 20 Nov 2022

See all articles by Jeffrey Grogger

Jeffrey Grogger

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: February 2003

Abstract

The rapid decline in the welfare caseload remains a subject of keen interest to both policymakers and researchers. In this paper, I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation spanning the period from 1986 to 1999 to analyze how the economy, welfare reform, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and other factors influenced welfare entries and exits, which in turn affect the caseload. I find that the decline in the welfare caseload resulted from both increases in exits and decreases in entries. Entries were most significantly affected by the economy, the decline in the real value of welfare benefits, and the expansion of the EITC. The EITC had substantial effects on initial entries onto welfare. Exits were most significantly affected by the economy and federal welfare reform. Federal reform had its greatest effects on longer-term spells of the type generally experienced by more disadvantaged recipients. Some out-of-sample predictions help explain the otherwise puzzling observation that, despite substantial increases in the unemployment rate since 2000, caseloads have remained roughly constant.

Suggested Citation

Grogger, Jeffrey T., Welfare Transitions in the 1990s: The Economy, Welfare Policy, and the EITC (February 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9472, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=375324

Jeffrey T. Grogger (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

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