The Transmission of Financial Shocks and Leverage of Financial Institutions: An Endogenous Regime Switching Framework

52 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2021 Last revised: 1 Jun 2022

See all articles by Kirstin Hubrich

Kirstin Hubrich

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Daniel F. Waggoner

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 23, 2020

Abstract

We conduct a novel empirical analysis of the role of leverage of financial institutions for the transmission of financial shocks to the macroeconomy. For that purpose we develop an endogenous regime-switching structural vector autoregressive model with time-varying transition probabilities that depend on the state of the economy. We propose new identification techniques for regime switching models.

Recently developed theoretical models emphasize the role of bank balance sheets for the build-up of financial instabilities and the amplification of financial shocks. We build a market-based measure of leverage of financial institutions employing institution-level data and find empirical evidence that real effects of financial shocks are amplified by the leverage of financial institutions in a financial-constraint regime. We also find evidence of heterogeneity in how depository financial institutions, global systemically important banks and selected nonbank financial institutions affect the transmission of shocks to the macroeconomy. Our results confirm the leverage ratio as a useful indicator from a policy perspective.

Keywords: Regime switching models, time-varying transition probabilities, financial shocks, leverage, bank and non-bank financial institutions, heterogeneity

JEL Classification: C55, G23, C11, C32, C53, E44, G21

Suggested Citation

Hubrich, Kirstin and Waggoner, Daniel F., The Transmission of Financial Shocks and Leverage of Financial Institutions: An Endogenous Regime Switching Framework (December 23, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3754617 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3754617

Kirstin Hubrich (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Daniel F. Waggoner

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ( email )

1000 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States
404-521-8278 (Phone)

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