Getting a Break in Bargaining?: An Upside of Time Delays

51 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021 Last revised: 27 Mar 2024

See all articles by Preyas S. Desai

Preyas S. Desai

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business

Pranav Jindal

Indian School of Business

Date Written: March 25, 2024

Abstract

Price negotiations are often characterized by either the buyer or the seller introducing delays and interruptions. In the bargaining literature, time delays are considered costly and could lower the consumer's incentives to engage in bargaining and also reduce the available surplus if the buyer and the seller engage in bargaining. In this paper, we explore the possibility that unanticipated delays from the seller can change the consumer's willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the product. In a set of laboratory experiments, we find evidence that relative to fixed pricing, bargaining can result in an increase in WTP and consequently in purchase likelihood. In particular, we find that the increase in WTP exists only when the seller delays her response in an unanticipated manner. Based on the recovered distributions of WTP, we find that the increase in profits under bargaining due to the increase in WTP can be sizable as compared to the gains from pure price discrimination. The results provide evidence that a seller can potentially benefit from manipulating her response time but only when such manipulation is not anticipated by the consumer. We provide preliminary evidence of the underlying mechanisms and discuss the implications of these findings for researchers as well as practitioners.

Keywords: price negotiations, fixed pricing, time delays, product valuation, willingness-to-pay, behavioral economics

JEL Classification: C7, D9

Suggested Citation

Desai, Preyas S. and Jindal, Pranav, Getting a Break in Bargaining?: An Upside of Time Delays (March 25, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3756608 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3756608

Preyas S. Desai

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States

Pranav Jindal (Contact Author)

Indian School of Business ( email )

Gachibowli
Hyderabad, 500032
India

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