Preference Submission Timing and College Admission Outcomes: Evidence from Turkey
Review of Economic Design
53 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2021 Last revised: 24 Aug 2023
Date Written: February 11, 2023
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of reducing information uncertainty on matching outcomes in a college choice setting. Turkey reformed its college admissions in 1999, changing the preference submission process for four-year programs from pre-exam to post-exam submission, both under the constrained Deferred Acceptance mechanism. A conceptual framework illustrates that the reform improved matching outcomes in two ways: (i) fewer programs with unfilled seats, (ii) more assortative matching between students and programs, i.e. higher cutoff ranks for more highly ranked programs. Results from a difference-in-differences strategy confirm such predictions and find that the reform led to less undercapacity among lower ranked programs and stronger assortative matching between high-achieving students and highly ranked programs. Moreover, we find some suggestive evidence that the post-exam submission may have led to fewer enrolled students overall but more female students in four-year programs.
Keywords: College admission, matching stability, post-exam submission, Deferred Acceptance mechanism, Turkey
JEL Classification: C78, D82, I23, I28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation