Resilience in Collective Bargaining

154 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2021 Last revised: 22 Jan 2024

See all articles by Carlos F. Avenancio-León

Carlos F. Avenancio-León

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Alessio Piccolo

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

Roberto Pinto

Lancaster University - Lancaster University Management School

Date Written: January 6, 2021

Abstract

A central finding of the theoretical literature on bargaining is that parties’ attitudes towards delay influence bargaining outcomes. However, the ability to endure delays, resilience, is often private information and hard to measure in most real-world contexts. In the context of collective bargaining, we show firms actively attempt to become financially resilient in anticipation of labor negotiations. Firms adjust their financial resilience to respond to the passage of right-to-work laws (RWLs), unionization, and labor negotiation events. Unions' financial structure also responds to RWLs. Our findings suggest resilience is key to understanding the process through which collective bargaining determines wages.

Keywords: bargaining, labor unions, right-to-work laws, debt structure.

JEL Classification: G32, J51, C78.

Suggested Citation

Avenancio-León, Carlos F. and Piccolo, Alessio and Pinto, Roberto, Resilience in Collective Bargaining (January 6, 2021). Kelley School of Business Research Paper No. 2021-22, Proceedings of the EUROFIDAI-ESSEC Paris December Finance Meeting 2023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3760854 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3760854

Carlos F. Avenancio-León

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

Alessio Piccolo (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business ( email )

1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
+18123914734 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://kelley.iu.edu/faculty-research/faculty-directory/profile.cshtml?id=APICCOL

Roberto Pinto

Lancaster University - Lancaster University Management School ( email )

Bailrigg
Lancaster, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/roberto-pinto/home

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