Family Firms in Entrepreneurial Finance: The Case of Corporate Venture Capital

46 Pages Posted: 12 May 2021 Last revised: 4 Mar 2024

See all articles by Mario Daniele Amore

Mario Daniele Amore

HEC Paris - Strategy & Business Policy; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Samuele Murtinu

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Valerio Pelucco

Bocconi University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 16, 2021

Abstract

We show that families are an engine of venturing activities: almost 30 percent of all corporate venture capital (CVC) deals in the US from 2000 to 2017 originated from family firms. Family firms, especially those led by family CEOs, orchestrate CVC activities differently than non-family firms: they syndicate more often and with more reputable investors, join larger syndicates, and make more proximate deals (geography- and industry-wise). Family firms’ approach to corporate venturing maps into performance results: family CVC-backed ventures exhibit a higher likelihood of successful exits. We explore several mechanisms pertaining to asymmetric information and risk management. Collectively, our results shed light on the important, and largely unexplored, role of family firms in CVC.

Keywords: Corporate venture capital; family ownership; investment; performance

JEL Classification: G24; G32; O32

Suggested Citation

Amore, Mario Daniele and Murtinu, Samuele and Pelucco, Valerio, Family Firms in Entrepreneurial Finance: The Case of Corporate Venture Capital (May 16, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3843842 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3843842

Mario Daniele Amore (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Strategy & Business Policy ( email )

Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Samuele Murtinu

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, +31 30 253 7373 3584 EC
Netherlands

Valerio Pelucco

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

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