The Goals of Class Actions

46 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2021 Last revised: 29 Nov 2021

Date Written: November 2021

Abstract

Class actions for monetary relief have long been the subject of intense legal and political debate. The stakes are now higher than ever. Contractual agreements requiring arbitration are proliferating, limiting the availability of class actions as a vehicle for collective redress. In Congress, legislative proposals related to class actions are mired in partisan division. Democrats would roll back mandatory arbitration agreements while Republicans would restrict class actions further.

This Note explains that many of the battles over class actions for monetary relief can be understood as disagreements over what goals they are supposed to serve. It examines two broad justifications for class actions: efficiency and representation. It then offers a taxonomy of the goals of class actions. The efficiency justification is associated with the goals of compensation and monetary deterrence; the representation justification is associated with the goals of providing access to justice and shaping laws and norms. An analysis of recent legislative proposals demonstrates that congressional Republicans prioritize the goal of compensation while congressional Democrats prioritize both representational goals.

This Note argues that the goals of class actions can be reconciled. It offers a framework for distinguishing between those class actions that are supposed to serve efficiency goals and those class actions that are supposed to serve representation goals. This framework can guide courts toward a more expansive understanding of the policy interests behind class actions. Furthermore, this reconciled understanding of class actions may offer a path toward crafting legislative compromises that are reasonably compatible with the current views of both Republicans and Democrats.

Suggested Citation

Faisman, Andrew, The Goals of Class Actions (November 2021). Andrew Faisman, The Goals of Class Actions, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 2157 (2021)., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3890436

Andrew Faisman (Contact Author)

Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th St
NEW YORK, NY 10027

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
117
Abstract Views
582
Rank
427,613
PlumX Metrics