Bureaucracy and Development

45 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2021 Last revised: 9 Mar 2023

See all articles by Timothy J. Besley

Timothy J. Besley

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Robin Burgess

London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Adnan Khan

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Guo Xu

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2021

Abstract

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in whether and how bureaucratic effectiveness contributes to development. Just what makes for an effective bureaucracy and what are the building blocks of state capacity remain subject to debate. This paper reviews the arguments connecting contemporary research using administrative data and field experiments to wider discussions of the origins of state capacity. Most current research has been focused on understanding specific features of the environment in which bureaucrats operate. We connect this to discussions of bureaucratic systems, specifically the relationship to politics, citizens, firms and NGOs.

Suggested Citation

Besley, Timothy J. and Burgess, Robin and Khan, Adnan and Xu, Guo, Bureaucracy and Development (August 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w29163, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3909595

Timothy J. Besley (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Robin Burgess

London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

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United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/rburgess/index_own.html

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Adnan Khan

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Guo Xu

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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