Voluntary Disclosure of Workforce Gender Diversity

52 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2022 Last revised: 4 May 2023

See all articles by Chuchu Liang

Chuchu Liang

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business

Ben Lourie

University of California, Irvine

Alex Nekrasov

University of Illinois Chicago

Il Sun Yoo

University of Hawaii at Manoa - Shidler College of Business

Date Written: May 3, 2023

Abstract

We examine managerial incentives to disclose the gender diversity of a firm’s workforce. We exploit information from employees’ online profiles to infer managers’ information about gender diversity for nondisclosing firms. Within industry, we find that firms are more likely to disclose gender diversity when women comprise a higher proportion of their workforce, consistent with managerial incentives to disclose favorable information. However, disclosure is more prevalent in industries with a low proportion of female employees, consistent with a higher demand for disclosure in a poor gender diversity environment. Regarding the potential benefits of disclosure, disclosing firms (a) enjoy more favorable media coverage of the firm’s diversity, and (b) attract a larger number of gender-lens ESG funds. Disclosing firms with a high proportion of female employees enjoy greater benefits. Overall, our study broadens our understanding of the evolving corporate disclosure landscape by providing evidence on firms’ incentives to disclose workforce gender diversity.

Keywords: voluntary disclosure; workforce gender diversity; corporate social responsibility (CSR), environmental, social, and governance (ESG); ESG media tone; ESG funds

Suggested Citation

Liang, Chuchu and Lourie, Ben and Nekrasov, Alexander and Yoo, Il Sun, Voluntary Disclosure of Workforce Gender Diversity (May 3, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3971818 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3971818

Chuchu Liang

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business ( email )

Irvine, CA California 92697
United States

Ben Lourie

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States

Alexander Nekrasov (Contact Author)

University of Illinois Chicago ( email )

1200 W Harrison St
Chicago, IL 60607
United States

HOME PAGE: http://business.uic.edu/profiles/alexander-nekrasov/

Il Sun Yoo

University of Hawaii at Manoa - Shidler College of Business ( email )

2404 Maile Way
Honolulu, HI 96822
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
693
Abstract Views
2,266
Rank
69,711
PlumX Metrics