The Internal Point of View in Private Law

Abstract

Many leading private law theorists claim to analyze private law from an internal point of view; a vantage point within which private law doctrine, institutions and procedure enjoy pride of place. Private law theory of a generation ago distinguished the internal from external points of view, valorizing the former and criticizing the latter for ignoring the normativity of private law or for mistaking private law for public law or regulation. The New Private Law, by contrast, asserts the complementarity of internal and external points of view, partly by emphasizing the value of functionalist analyses of legal form. In this article, we canvas leading accounts of the internal point of view in private law (provided by corrective justice and civil recourse theorists, respectively) and identify their shortcomings: notably, their inability to ground assertions about the normative and explanatory priority of the internal point of view, and about its relationship (whether of exclusivity or complementarity) to external points of view. We offer an alternative, and we think better, rendering of the internal point of view, drawing on the work of John Finnis. Amongst other things, our account vindicates the New Private Law’s alluring but elusive promise of perspectival integration, showing how private law may be understood as an interlocking set of practices of public practical deliberation equally concerned with reasoned compliance and behavioral conformity with practically reasonable laws.

Keywords: Private Law Theory, Jurisprudence

JEL Classification: K11, K12, K13, K15