A Theory of Involuntary Unrequited International Transfers

Posted: 17 Jul 2003

See all articles by Murray C. Kemp

Murray C. Kemp

Macquarie University - College of Commerce; UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics; Chukyo University

Koji Shimomura

Kobe University - Research Institute for Economic and Business Administration

Abstract

The theory of involuntary international transfers (war indemnities) has been constructed on the assumption that the donor and recipient are completely indifferent to each other's well-being. The assumption is hard to justify since usually the transfers closely follow periods during which the countries have been dropping bombs on each other. In the present paper, we rework the theory on the more plausible assumption that the well-being of each country is negatively influenced by the well-being of the other country. It is shown that, contrary to the conventional theory, the donor might benefit at the expense of the recipient, even when local Walrasian stability is imposed.

Suggested Citation

Kemp, Murray C. C. and Shimomura, Koji, A Theory of Involuntary Unrequited International Transfers. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=398040

Murray C. C. Kemp

Macquarie University - College of Commerce ( email )

Sydney, New South Wales
Australia

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics ( email )

High Street
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
+61 2 9385 3325 (Ext. 3325) (Phone)
+61 2 9313 6337 (Fax)

Chukyo University

101-2 Yagoto Honmachi
Showa-ku Institute of Economics
Nagoya-shi, Aichi-ken

Koji Shimomura (Contact Author)

Kobe University - Research Institute for Economic and Business Administration ( email )

2-1, Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku
Kobe, 657-8501
Japan
+81 78 881 1212 (Phone)
+81 78 861 6434 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
486
PlumX Metrics