Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of Managed Care

Posted: 28 Apr 2003

See all articles by Frank A. Sloan

Frank A. Sloan

Duke University - Center for Health Policy, Law and Management; Duke University, Fuqua School of Business-Economics Group; Duke University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Mark A. Hall

Wake Forest University - School of Law

Abstract

In response to widespread dissatisfaction with managed care, states have enacted numerous statutes, known as managed care patient protection laws, that address concerns of consumers and medical care providers. These laws include (in various combinations): (1) liability and external review provisions, (2) increasing choice of and access to providers, (3) protecting providers from undue influence, and (4) setting general coverage standards and specific coverage mandates. These laws are now well understood in terms of political responses to public and interest group concerns, but what is less well understood are justifications for managed care regulation in terms of well articulated market failures. Also lacking is an examination of how well legal enactments and enforcement activities respond to market failure theory. Accordingly, this article has two distinct parts: A detailed analysis of the market failures that managed care patient protection laws attempt to correct. And, a report of a 50-state survey of state managed care protection laws and their enforcement. We conclude that, while there are some deficiencies in managed care markets as they are constituted currently, overall the patient protection laws are not well designed to address many of the most important deficiencies since few of these laws address the fundamental source of these market flaws. At most, many of these laws attempt to treat only some of the symptoms of market defects. However, these laws are not being neglected by enforcement agencies. Enforcement activities are evident in most states, and the variation in enforcement relates to legitimate differences in legal, market and agency conditions.

Keywords: managed care, patient protections laws, market failure theory, regulatory enforcement

Suggested Citation

Sloan, Frank A. and Hall, Mark A., Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of Managed Care. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=399100

Frank A. Sloan

Duke University - Center for Health Policy, Law and Management ( email )

Box 90253
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-684-8047 (Phone)
919-684-6246 (Fax)

Duke University, Fuqua School of Business-Economics Group ( email )

Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0097
United States

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Mark A. Hall (Contact Author)

Wake Forest University - School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States
336-716-9807 (Phone)

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