Federalism in 2030

Graz Law Working Paper No 01-2022

C Bezemek, Constitutionalism 2030 (2022)

21 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2022 Last revised: 24 Jan 2023

See all articles by Bilyana Petkova

Bilyana Petkova

Middlesex University London; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project

Date Written: January 26, 2022

Abstract

In this chapter, I discuss federalism as a power-sharing mechanism within larger quasi-federated entities such as the European Union and in decentralized states like the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, arguing that seemingly federalism might have lost much of its appeal (or at least momentum). This trend is then juxtaposed to the emerging rise of urbanism. I present some sociological findings as well as legal doctrine related to cities in the United States and the European Union, and point to empirical examples of city networks in the shared economy, human rights, and the environment. The argument is that the resulting power-sharing vacuum that opens as a result of the failures of vertical federalism allows cities (and urban networks) to grow in prominence on a global stage posing new challenges to constitutionalism and international law. With collective action problems moving away from the traditional avoidance of conventional welfare (the main raison d’etre of the European Union and of the Westphalian state before it) horizontal federalism asks for new and bold ways of reimagining communities.

Keywords: federalism, urbanism, brexit, separatism, constitutionalism, constitutive units, identity, subsidiarity

JEL Classification: K40, K00

Suggested Citation

Petkova, Bilyana, Federalism in 2030 (January 26, 2022). Graz Law Working Paper No 01-2022, C Bezemek, Constitutionalism 2030 (2022), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4018512 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4018512

Bilyana Petkova (Contact Author)

Middlesex University London ( email )

, The Burroughs, Hendon, London, United Kingdom
London, NW4 4BT
United Kingdom

Yale University - Yale Information Society Project ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

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