An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy
15 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2003
Date Written: April 2003
Abstract
I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I derive optimal equilibria and consider a series of comparative statistics and extensions.
Keywords: Merger policy, repeated games
JEL Classification: F00, L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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