An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy

15 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2003

See all articles by Luis M. B. Cabral

Luis M. B. Cabral

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I derive optimal equilibria and consider a series of comparative statistics and extensions.

Keywords: Merger policy, repeated games

JEL Classification: F00, L40

Suggested Citation

Cabral, Luis M. B., An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy (April 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=415840

Luis M. B. Cabral (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-0858 (Phone)
212-998-4218 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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