Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships

Posted: 12 Jun 2003

See all articles by Oliver Hart

Oliver Hart

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

The question of what should determine the boundaries between public and private firms in an advanced capitalist economy is a highly topical one. In this paper I will try to summarize some recent theoretical thinking on this issue. I will divide the paper into two parts. First, I will make some general remarks about the relationship between the theoretical literature on privatization and incomplete contracting theories of the firm. Second, I will use some of the ideas from this literature to develop a very preliminary model of public-private partnerships.

Keywords: public-private partnerships, ownership, incomplete contracts

JEL Classification: D23, H1, H4

Suggested Citation

Hart, Oliver D., Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=416000

Oliver D. Hart (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-3461 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,190
PlumX Metrics